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Agent-based modelling can be used to investigate the behavioural and social aspects of tax
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rst model emphasises the
role of occupational choice in tax compliance, and explores the e¤ect of non-compliance on
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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of tax compliance has the objectives of explaining and predict-
ing compliance behaviour. Achievement of these objectives is essential for the design of
benecial interventions that increase the level of compliance and raise revenue. Several
di¤erent research methodologies can contribute to this programme of research. Theo-
retical analysis can develop models that are evaluated by empirical studies and tested
using lab and eld experiments. The focus of this paper is a further methodology that
can be usefully applied to analyze compliance: agent-based modelling. This is a research
methodology that is steadily gaining in popularity due to its exibility and potential so-
phistication. We hope that the paper will demonstrate that agent-based modelling can
yield fresh insights when applied to the study of compliance.
A successful application of agent-based modelling uses the best of economic theory
to describe the behaviour of agents with heterogeneous characteristics and allows for
interaction among these agents in a rich environment. The components of economic theory
on which we focus are recent behavioural advances in understanding of the compliance
decision, the e¤ect of occupational choice in creating opportunities for non-compliance,
and the role of social networks in the transmission of information. In brief, our model of
the compliance decision and policy intervention combines attitudes towards compliance,
beliefs about audit strategy, and opportunities for evasion. It also recognizes the social
setting in which the compliance decision is made.
The paper describes the theoretical background of the modelling and the numerical
results from two di¤erent agent-based models. The rst model focuses on occupational
choice and the distributional consequences of non-compliance. The second model gen-
eralizes the rst by adding repeated social interaction and the transmission of attitudes
and beliefs in a dynamic setting. The models demonstrate that non-compliance increases
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inequality and risk-taking in the economy, and that di¤erent compliance behaviours can
be established within occupational groups. It is also possible that taxpayers, on average,
can systematically hold a belief about the probability of audit that remains consistently
above the true rate. When audit strategies are compared we nd that a strategy of
auditing a xed number of individuals within each occupational group delivers a higher
level of revenue than strategies with randomness across groups or a systematic focus on
a particular group or groups.
Section 2 provides a descriptive introduction to agent-based modelling. Successful ap-
plication of agent-based modelling requires a credible model of individual choice. In our
context the role of opportunities for non-compliance is central. Section 3 consequently
implements an agent-based model with choice of occupation using an extension of the
Allingham-Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) framework1. We then extend the model
further to incorporate advances from behavioural economics, including the endogenous
development of attitudes and beliefs within a social network. Section 4 reviews the lit-
erature on behavioural explanations of the individual compliance decision, and Section 5
describes how the behavioural concepts are implemented in the model. The paper is com-
pleted in Section 6 by analyzing the choice of audit strategy in an agent-based model that
includes network e¤ects and behavioural assumptions on preferences. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Agent-Based Modelling
Agent-based modelling is a computer simulation technique that is increasing in popularity
for the study of economic and social behaviour. It involves the construction of a set
of agents and an environment in which they interact, and has proved useful in many
1The computer code for the simulations we report is available on the SpringerPlus website. The code
is written for Matlab but can be easily converted to run with Scilab.
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di¤erent areas of natural science and social science. There have been numerous economic
applications (surveyed in Tesfatsion 2006) and several previous studies of tax compliance
(Andrei et al. 2014; Bloomquist 2004, 2012; Davis et al. 2003; Hashimzade et al. 2014;
Korobow et al. 2007). Before describing what our work contributes to this literature, we
provide in this section a general introduction to agent-based modelling.
To implement an agent-based model the rst step is to dene the agents that will in-
teract and the environment in which the interaction takes place. In general, an individual
agent will be characterized by their ability, objective, and information set. Some of the
characteristics will be xed at the outset of the simulation (e.g. ability) but others may
be updated by experience (e.g. information). In economic applications agents are typi-
cally assigned an objective such as maximization of income or utility and make choices
to achieve the objective. This need not be the case, and in many other areas of science
agents can be mechanistic (e.g. interaction of particles controlled by the laws of dynam-
ics) or simply random (e.g. very basic biological interaction). The number of agents and
the distribution of characteristics of agents can be chosen according to the context of the
research question or selected by a random process.
The second step is to construct the environment within which the agents interact. An
economic environment could be a market place with trading rules or an economy with
some set of institutions that govern interaction. An application in physics may involve
placing particles in a dust cloud; or placing animals in a eld could be an application in
biology. There may also be randomness involved in the choice of the environment.
Given the agents and the environment, the nal step is to allow the agents to interact
(economic agents can buy and sell, or particles collide and coalesce) and to observe the
outcome. If there are multiple periods of interaction then both the dynamic process and
its steady states can be of interest. These will be governed by the initial state of the
system, by the choices made by the agents, and by any random components during the
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interaction. The parameters of the system, or the probability distributions governing the
choice of parameters, can be varied to test the e¤ect of their choice on the outcome. The
government can be an agent that chooses policy, or else it can be part of the environment
with policy as a parameter.
An important question that must be addressed is the intellectual benet of running
a simulation compared to undertaking a purely theoretical exercise. It should always be
remembered that the results of a simulation are only valid for the assumed parameter
conguration and that there may be a point in the parameter space where a di¤erent
result holds. Robustness checks can increase condence that a nding applies to more
than one specic parameter conguration but can never be denitive in the way that a
formal proof is denitive. However, simulations can demonstrate that particular outcomes
of interest are possible. For example, we might be interested in whether the subjective
belief about the probability of audit can exceed the objective probability. A simulation is
able to conrm that this possibility can arise.
Many simulations can provide qualitative knowledge about outcomes, where qualitative
knowledge includes both the nature of equilibrium (e.g. can the subjective probability
be above the objective?) and the comparative statics of equilibrium (e.g. does the gap
between the probabilities increase or decrease with more auditing?). Whether simulations
are able to reach quantitative conclusions (such as predicting the optimal number of
audits) is debatable and depends on the validity of model and the calibration of the
model. For simple models it is highly unlikely that there can be anything of quantitative
signicance. Certainly, we do not claim that the models we discuss in this paper are able
to provide quantitative results in this sense because they lack, at the very least, adequate
calibration. As a nal comment on the methodology, it should always be appreciated that
simulation is not an end in itself, but is only justied if it provides insight that could not
be obtained by any alternative analytical means.
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A range of free software is available for undertaking agent-based simulations. For
an economist the usefulness of this software is typically limited by the fact that it does
not permit agents to undertake complex optimization within the simulations. This is
important in many applications since it is the inclusion of optimal choice that distinguishes
economic behaviour from modelling in the natural sciences. For some models it may be
possible to compute explicit solutions to the optimization problems in which case the free
software is adequate. Whenever a numerical optimization sub-routine is required, as it
is in the models described in the following sections, it is necessary to employ suitable
software (such as Matlab) for writing dedicated codes.
3 Risk-Taking and Income Distribution
A key element for understanding the compliance decision is the role the opportunity for
non-compliance plays in the choice of occupation. Working as a paid employee either
rules out non-compliance, if labour income is subject to a withholding tax (such as the
PAYE system in the UK), or makes successful non-compliance very unlikely, if there is a
system of third-party reporting. In contrast, choosing to be self-employed and accepting
the responsibility for tax ling opens the opportunity for non-compliance. It is through
this channel that occupational choice is inter-linked with the compliance decision.
A second aspect of occupational choice is also linked to the compliance decision. Gen-
erally, the level of income received from employment is more certain than the income
generated from self-employment. This implies that choosing self-employment also in-
volves accepting greater income risk and, therefore, all else constant, the self-employed
will have a lower degree of risk aversion than the employed. This directly determines the
extent of non-compliance: the amount of income that is not declared increases as risk
aversion decreases. In this way occupational choice self-selects those who will evade most
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into an occupation where they have the opportunity to evade.
Our rst example of agent-based modelling incorporates occupational choice into a
compliance model. This is achieved by extending the model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) to permit each individual, rst, to make an occupational choice
and, second, to make an evasion decision based on the realization of income. The model
can be seen as a generalization of the work of Pestieau and Possen (1991). The focus of
the simulation is the e¤ect that non-compliance has upon the amount of risk-taking and
income distribution in the economy.
The model has three occupations. Employment is modelled as a safe occupation with
a xed wage that can di¤er among individuals. There is no opportunity to be non-
compliant in employment due either to the operation of a withholding tax or through
third-party reporting. The other two occupations are di¤erent forms of self-employment.
Self-employment is intended to represent running a small business, and so the income is
assumed to be risky. However, it is possible to evade tax on income from self-employment
since it is not subject to the same degree of third-party reporting. We adopt the nat-
ural assumption that each self-employed person makes a compliance decision after the
(random) income from self-employment is realized. The choice of occupation is made
by comparing the utility derived from employment to the expected utility (taking into
account optimal compliance for each income realization) from the two self-employment
occupations. The occupation that delivers the highest utility is chosen. In this simulation
the occupational choice decision is made once. In the simulations of sections 5 and 6 it
is made at the start of every period because the choice may change as the information
of the taxpayer evolves through the interaction with others. Consequently, the results we
report are the aggregate outcome of repeated static simulations rather than the outcome
of a dynamic simulation.
The simulation randomly assigns to each taxpayer a set of characteristics fw; ; s1; s2g,
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where w is the wage in employment,  is the coe¢ cient of (relative) risk aversion in a
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, and si is the level of skill in self-
employment occupation i. The income earned from self-employment in occupation i is siyi
where yi is drawn from a beta distribution g ().2 The variable yi can be interpreted as local
market conditions, so that income is determined jointly by individual skill and market
conditions. The draw of yi is unique for each taxpayer, so in a given round of simulation, a
low-skill individual in occupation imay earn more that a high-skill individual if the former
obtains a benecial draw of yi. It is assumed that  (y1) <  (y2) and 2 (y1) < 2 (y2),
so that for a given skill level self-employed occupation 2 has a higher mean income but
also a greater variance of income. We therefore refer to occupation 2 as being riskier than
occupation 1. If a taxpayer has realized outcome siyi from self-employment i the amount
of income that is not declared, Ei (yi), is determined by
max
fEig
U(Ei; yi) = pU([1  t] siyi   ftEi) + (1  p)U([1  t] siyi + tEi):
Taking account of the choice of Ei; the expected utility from self-employed occupation i
is then
EUi =
Z
U(Ei (yi)i ; yi)g (yi)dyi:
The expected payo¤s from the three occupations fU0; EU1; EU2g are compared (where
occupation 0 is employment), and the maximum payo¤determines the chosen occupation.
The agent-based simulation performs the following steps:
1. Individual characteristics are randomly drawn;
2. Occupation is chosen given characteristics;
3. Incomes are realized and the compliance decision is made;
2The advantage of the beta distribution is in the exible choice of parameters, allowing density func-
tions with required skewness to be obtained, and the nite support ensures robust convergence of the
numerical integration.
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4. The tax authority conducts random audits and punishes any evasion that is detected.
The outcome is calculated for two di¤erent scenarios. The rst scenario assumes that
all income is honestly declared. This provides a baseline from which to judge the e¤ect
of non-compliance. The second scenario assumes that non-compliance may take place.
Each simulation had 1000 individuals and was repeated 50 times. The data are pooled
across the 50 rounds in order to smooth out the consequences of randomness and so the
gures report the outcomes for a total of 50,000 individuals. The following parameters
were used for the illustrative example: the tax rate was 25 %, each self-employed taxpayer
was audited with a probability of 5 %, and the ne rate was 150 % of evaded tax.
Our rst two gures compare the distribution of occupational choices between the two
scenarios. Figure 1 is a histogram of the distribution of taxpayers across the three occu-
pations with honesty. The three occupations are on the horizontal axis and the vertical
axis shows the number of taxpayers in each occupation. The corresponding histogram for
when non-compliance was possible is shown in Figure 2. Comparing the gures shows that
non-compliance causes the distribution of occupational choices to shift away from employ-
ment toward the two risky self-employment occupations. As a consequence there is more
occupational risk-taking when non-compliance is possible. In addition to this increase in
occupational risk-taking there is a further increase in total risk-taking in the economy
because some of the taxpayers choosing self-employment are also evading. Hence, the
total amount of risk-taking in the economy is increased by the existence of tax evasion.
This observation is interesting in view of past discussion (Kanbur 1981; Black and de
Meza 1997) on the e¢ ciency of risk-taking in competitive economies.
The e¤ect of non-compliance on income distribution is presented in two ways. Table
1 provides summary statistics of the income distributions with and without evasion, and
Figure 3 plots the Lorenz curves for the two distributions. The e¤ect of non-compliance is
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Figure 1: Occupational choice with honest tax payment
Figure 2: Occupational choice with non-compliance
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Honesty Non-compliance
Mean income 9.986 13.671
Gini coe¢ cient 0.380 0.428
Table 1: Income distribution
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 3: Lorenz Curves for honesty (solid) and non-compliance (dashed)
to increase the mean income level, where the mean is computed after both taxes and nes
have been imposed. Non-compliance also increases the inequality of income as measured
by the Gini coe¢ cient. Figure 3 shows that there is Lorenz-curve dominance for the
income distribution with honesty, and so the ranking is independent of the inequality
index.
Another consequence of non-compliance is that those who fail to declare their true
income do not pay the statutory tax rate. Dene the e¤ective tax rate for a non-compliant
taxpayer who is not audited by
ETRNA =
Tax payment on income declared
Actual income
; (1)
and for a non-compliant taxpayer who is audited by
ETRA =
Correct tax payment plus ne
Actual income
: (2)
ETRNA will be below the statutory tax rate and ETRA will be above the statutory tax
rate. The consequence of non-compliance by taxpayers is that the distribution of e¤ective
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Figure 4: Histogram of e¤ective tax rates
tax rates is unrelated to income and does not correspond to the at tax intended by
the government. This point is illustrated in Figure 4 which displays a histogram of tax
rates. This is tri-modal, reecting the three groups: non-compliant taxpayers who are
not audited, compliant taxpayers, and non-compliant taxpayers who are audited. Given
the propensity for taxpayers to be non-compliant and the audit rate of 5 %, the majority
of taxpayers pay an e¤ective tax rate below the statutory rate of 25 %. The general
observation is that non-compliance undermines the intended tax policy of the government.
These results illustrate some of the e¤ects that non-compliance can have upon the
economy. The possibility of non-compliance encourages entry into risky occupations,
while the consequence of non-compliance and auditing is increased inequality and a dis-
persion of the e¤ective tax rate. The agent-based model reported in this section shows the
importance of introducing opportunities, but there are more features of the compliance
decision that need to be taken into account. The next section therefore reviews recent
literature on the applications of behavioural economics to the compliance decision.
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4 Modelling Compliance
The properties of an agent-based model are determined by the behaviour of the individual
agents. This implies that modelling the choice behaviour behind the compliance decision
is key to obtaining interesting and credible insights. The aim when constructing a model
should be to integrate the best of current theory and evidence. For the compliance decision
this involves an acknowledgement of the limitations of the Allingham-Sandmo (1972)
model of tax compliance and the incorporation of ideas from behavioural economics. The
purpose of this section is to briey review some models of the individual compliance
decision. A more complete survey can be found in Hashimzade et al. (2013).
Research on compliance behaviour has built on the Yitzhaki (1974) model which is
itself a modication of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Correspondingly, we refer to this
below as the ASY model. The amount of evasion, E, is chosen to maximize expected
utility
EU = pU(Y [1  t]  tfE) + [1  p]U(Y [1  t] + tE);
where p is the probability of audit, Y is income, t is the tax rate, and f is the ne levied on
tax evaded. The model takes the level of income as xed. As we have already noted, the
source of income is an important determinant of the opportunity for evasion due to third-
party reporting and withholding on employment income. The inclusion of occupational
choice is one of the central features of our agent-based models. For the present, we set
this issue aside and focus on choices contingent on income.
The literature has identied two problems with the predictions of the ASY model.
First, when confronted with the parameter values observed in practice the model pre-
dicts that all taxpayers should be non-compliant. Formally, the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for E > 0 is
p <
1
1 + f
:
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In practice, the value of f is rarely more than 2, so non-compliance occurs (E > 0) if
p < 1=3. The exact value of p is information that only revenue services are party to, but
no revenue service audits anywhere are even approaching one third of taxpayers. In this
sense, all taxpayers should be non-compliant. Second, the predicted relationship between
the amount of non-compliance and the tax rate is counter to intuitive expectation and
counter to some (but not all) evidence. The formal result is that decreasing absolute risk
aversion is a su¢ cient condition for
dE
dt
< 0:
These results have led to a considerable research e¤ort to identify alternative models of
the compliance decision that make predictions with greater conformity to the facts. The
solutions proposed to improve the predictions of the model include appeal to non-expected
utility theory and to social customs. We will discuss each of these in turn.
A general representation of non-expected utility choice theory is given by writing the
value function, V , as
V = w1(p; 1  p)v(Y [1  t]  tfE) + w2(p; 1  p)v(Y [1  t] + tE): (3)
In (3) wi(p; 1  p); i = 1; 2; are weighting functions that translate the probabilities p and
1  p into more general weights. The typical assumption is that unlikely events are over-
weighted, so in the context of compliance w1(p; 1   p) > p: The function v() is a payo¤
function that can be more general than a utility function. For example, it is normally
assumed that utility is concave (U 00 < 0) which is not a property that a value function
need satisfy.
Within this general framework several alternatives have been proposed:
 Rank Dependent Expected Utility (Quiggin 1982) imposes structure on the weighting
functions
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 Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) uses weighted probabilities and an
s-shaped payo¤ function, and compares incomes to a reference point
 Non-Additive Probabilities (e.g., Chateauneuf 1994) do not require the normal con-
sistency of aggregation for probabilities
 Ambiguity (e.g., Snow and Warren 2005) permits uncertainty over the probability
of outcomes
The appearance of weighting functions (or beliefs) in these alternative preference struc-
ture can improve the predictions by making the su¢ cient condition for evasion tighter and
individual-specic. However, they do not change the direction of the tax e¤ect to make
dE=dt > 0. In addition, these alternatives can have their own shortcomings as explored in
detail in Hashimzade et al. (2013). Variants of prospect theory to describe tax compliance
are used, for example, by Yaniv (1999), al Nowaihi and Dhami (2007), and Bernasconi
and Zanardi (2004). A di¢ culty with this approach can be seen by adopting the standard
Kahneman-Tversky value function
v(z) =

z; if z  0;
 
   z ; 
 > 1; if z < 0; (4)
and choosing the reference point as income if the correct tax payment is made, Y [1  t].
The payo¤ function then becomes
V = Et

w2   w1
f

; (5)
so that the optimal choice is either to comply in full or to declare no income. This is a
simple consequence of the non-concavity of the objective function.
The existence of stigma from non-compliance and the existence of a social custom
for compliance have identical formal representations. Correspondingly, we focus on social
customs in what follows. A social custom is an informal rule of behaviour that summarizes
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the attitude toward compliance. A loss of social custom utility (or alternatively, a stigma
cost or psychic cost) is incurred if the custom is broken
V =

U(Y [1  t]); if E = 0;
EU   i; if E > 0: (6)
Across individuals there will be a cuto¤  such that i <  =) E > 0 and i   =)
E = 0. If i = i(m;E); (m the proportion of population evading) evasion becomes a
social decision. Myles and Naylor (1996) show that im(m;E) < 0 opens the possibility
of multiple equilibria.
For some specications of the stigma or social cost, it becomes possible to obtain
dE=dt > 0. In a recent paper Piolatto and Rablen (2013) disentangle four distinct ele-
ments of prospect theory in their roles for the individual compliance decision; in particular,
they nd that probability weighting has no e¤ect upon the sign of dE=dt. Furthermore,
they prove that when the expected utility theory model is augmented with stigma, or the
psychic cost of non-compliance, it can overturn the sign of the tax e¤ect. Thus, prospect
theory o¤ers no fundamental advantage over the expected utility theory with this par-
ticular modication. Based on these observations, we do not need to feel bound either
by using expected utility based on objective probability or to be restricted by any of the
particular alternatives to the expected utility theory. We proceed, therefore, by mixing
subjective beliefs and stigma with convenient functional forms.
5 Attitudes, Beliefs and Network E¤ects
The empirical analysis of the determinants of tax evasion has demonstrated two important
features. First, there is a strong evidence that the social setting inuences the individual
compliance decision. For example, individual perceptions of the justiability of tax evasion
in a country are positively associated with the measures of aggregate tax evasion in that
country, according to the World Values Survey (Slemrod 2007). We refer to this e¤ect as
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the attitude to compliance, or attitude. An aggregate measure of the individual attitudes
to compliance across a society can also be viewed as the tax morale prevailing in that
society. One can think about the e¤ect of tax morale upon the individual attitudes to
compliance as an externality: an individual who holds the view that non-compliance can
be (sometimes) justied contributes to the low tax morale in the society which, in turn,
makes for that individual the decision to evade tax more easily acceptable.
Second, the probability of audit is not revealed to taxpayers by the revenue service.
Therefore, in the individual evaluation of the expected benet from evasion the probabil-
ity of being audited and found to be non-compliant is subjective, rather than objective.
While the objective probability is part of the audit strategy of the revenue service, the
subjective probabilities may be formed on the basis of individual experience and available
information, and can, of course, be di¤erent for di¤erent individuals. To distinguish be-
tween the objective and the subjective probabilities we refer to the latter as the subjective
belief, or just belief.
If attitudes and beliefs are determined, among other factors, by experience and infor-
mation, it is natural to assume that they can evolve and change for a given individual over
time as he or she interacts with the revenue service (through accumulation of experience)
and with other individuals (through accumulation and exchange of information). Fur-
thermore, information exchange is more likely to occur (or more information is likely to
be exchanged) if the individuals belong to the same occupational group. Individuals meet
with their contacts in the social network, and meetings allow exchange of information on
beliefs. In addition, at a meeting, individuals may observe each others attitude to eva-
sion. For example, individual 1 can infer something about individual 2s attitude simply
by learning whether or not individual 2 has evaded tax previously. This will a¤ect 1s
own attitude and, through this channel, 1s future evasion decisions. The same may take
place for individual 2. This, in particular, can explain why social groups have di¤erent
16
behaviour with respect to tax evasion.
We have incorporated the dynamics of attitudes and beliefs into an agent-based model
by adding to the individual compliance decision a process of learning within a social net-
work according to the algorithm outlined below. It should be stressed that the behaviour
we model involves two dimensions of bounded rationality. First, they apply very simple
learning rules and update information only from contacts and not by observation of the
wider world. Second, the agents are not forward-looking and so do not make any strate-
gic inter-temporal decisions. The model therefore balances the pure rationality of much
economic theory with the frequent empirical observation of bounded rationality.
5.1 Networks and meetings
In an economy with N individuals the social network is described by a symmetric N N
matrix A with Aij = 1 if individuals i and j are linked and Aij = 0 otherwise. The links
are bi-directional: if i knows j then j knows i.3 In our simulations the network is
xed at the outset and does not change; one can also introduce random or endogenous
changes in the network structure. Time is divided into discrete periods, and in every
period each individual chooses an occupation, earns income, and decides how much of
this income to declare. Declarations are audited (according to some randomizing device
as described below), after which individuals linked in the network randomly meet and
exchange information.
Here we introduce two additional layers of randomness: not all individuals in the
network meet in every period, and not every meeting results in an information exchange.
This is implemented by introducing anNN matrix C of zeros and ones, drawn randomly
in each period; this matrix represents the probabilities of meetings between individuals.
3A matrix that is not symmetric captures uni-directional links. This can be used to investigate the
e¤ect of a celebrity.
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Thus, in each period a random selection of meetings occur described by an element-by-
element product of A and C: individuals i and j meet during a period if AijCij = 1 and
do not meet otherwise.
Furthermore, at a meeting of i and j information is exchanged only with some probabil-
ity. It is possible to consider various patterns in the probability of information exchange;
one plausible assumption is that the probability depends on the occupational groups to
which i and j belong. More specically, we assume that the probability of information
exchange between i and j is higher when i and j belong to the same occupational group,
and that it does not depend on their individual characteristics or other model parameters.
With three occupations, in general, six di¤erent probabilities can be introduced, denoted
by q, where ;  2 f0; 1; 2g ; and q > q for all  and  6= .
5.2 Formation of beliefs
In period t individual i makes an occupational choice and (after income is realized) a
compliance decision on the basis of the subjective belief, pit, that i will be audited and
caught if non-compliant. The belief is determined by audits prior to t (experience) and
interaction with other individuals (information).
5.2.1 Audits and beliefs
The rst updating e¤ect of an audit is that of experience and is described by
~pit = X
i
tP +
 
1 X it

d
 
pit

; P 2 [0; 1] ;
where X it = 1 if i was audited in t and X
i
t = 0 otherwise. The parameter P is the
benchmark probability to which an agent updates their subjective belief following an
audit. The choice of P and d (pit) allows exibility in the modelling of the updating rule.
Two di¤erent mechanisms for the formation of subjective beliefs are considered, the
target e¤ect and the bomb-crater e¤ect. With the target e¤ect, immediately after an
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audit the subjective belief rises, possibly to one, and then decays. In other words, if
i is audited and caught in period t he believes that now the tax authority will target
him as an evader and will certainly or nearly certainly audit him again, but if i is not
audited he believes that he is less likely to be a target and is less likely to be audited next
time. In the simulations we assume the maximal target e¤ect and proportional decay:
P = 1 and d (pit) = p
i
t;  2 (0; 1). With the bomb-crater e¤ect (e.g., Guala and Mittone,
2005), immediately after an audit the belief falls, possibly to zero, and then rises. That
is, if i is audited and caught in period t he believes that he is less likely to be audited
again (similar to the belief that a bomb is unlikely to hit a crater made by the previous
bomb), but subsequently worries that his turn to be audited again is approaching. In the
simulations we assume the maximal bomb-crater e¤ect and proportional increase: P = 0
and d (pit) = p
i
t +  (1  pit) ;  2 (0; 1). The empirical evidence on which mechanism is
correct is mixed and does not provide a decisive argument in favour of one over the other.
5.2.2 Information exchange and beliefs
The second updating e¤ect takes place at a meeting. Specically, the individuals meet
after audits take place, and after their own subjective belief is updated, either according
to the target mechanism or to the bomb-crater mechanism. If an information exchange
occurs at a meeting between i and j, is belief is further updated according to the rule
pit+1 = ~p
i
t + (1  )

Xjt P +
 
1 Xjt

~pjt

:
This can also be written
pit+1 =

~pit + (1  )P; if j audited at t;
~pit + (1  ) ~pjt ; otherwise.
The belief pit+1 is carried into the next period and is used when making occupational
choice and evasion decision. A similar update takes place for individual j. Beliefs at time
t = 0 in the simulations are assigned randomly.
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5.3 Formation of attitudes
In the social custom approach to individual decision-making it is assumed that an in-
dividual derives additional utility if his or her decision is in line with the social custom
(equivalently, utility is lost if the decision goes against social custom). In general, the
importance of the social custom, or its weight in the utility function, can be specic for
an individual. Since a social custom emerges in a society of interacting individuals, it is
reasonable to assume that the weight assigned to the social custom by an individual is
determined by interaction in the social network. For example, if the social custom is to
pay taxes honestly, the weight will be higher when the number of honest taxpayers known
to that individual is greater.
In the simulation the dynamic process for the importance of the social custom is
implemented in the following way. Each individual i is randomly assigned a level of
importance, i0; at time t = 0. This value is then updated in those time periods when
there is an information exchange between individual i and some other individual, say, j.
The updating process is described by
it+1 =
1
X(i) + 1
h
itX(i) + 1[Ejt=0]
i
;
where X(i) is the number of previous meetings for i at which information was exchanged,
and 1[A] = 1 if A it true and zero otherwise. One can easily verify that in this formulation
it+1 > 
i
t if information is exchanged with an honest taxpayer and 
i
t+1 < 
i
t if information
is exchanged with a non-compliant taxpayer. This form of social custom is added to
preferences over income described by a CRRA utility function.
5.4 Equilibrium
Having specied individual decision-making and the process of interaction with other
individuals, we now turn to the audit strategy of the tax authority. As the benchmark
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case, we rst assume a simple random probability of audit: each self-employed individual
is audited with the same constant probability; those in paid employment are not audited.4
We ran simulations for an economy populated by N = 1000 agents with heterogeneous
individual characteristics. Each agent is characterized by risk preferences (captured by
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion), wage in employment, skill level in the two self-
employment occupations, a subjective probability of audit, and a weighting of the social
custom. As with the simulation in section 3, risk preferences, wage in employment,
and skills in self-employment are drawn at the outset and remain xed for each agent.
Furthermore, we retain the assumption that earnings in self-employment are random and
that self-employment occupation 2 has a higher mean and variance for equal skills levels.
The subjective probability and the weight on the social custom are updated each period
as described above.
At the beginning of every period an agent chooses an occupation, and, if self-employment
is chosen, then observes an income realization and decides how much income to declare.
Although we formally model a fresh occupational choice taking place at the start of each
period it is better to interpret the agents as typically doing no more than just assessing the
costs and benets of each available occupation in each period. Since the characteristics
of the agents do not change dramatically from period to period, the choice of occupation
remains the same in the overwhelming majority of cases, and only occasionally does an
agent switch to a di¤erent occupation. Income declarations are randomly audited, and
non-compliant taxpayers are ned if caught. Agents update their beliefs about audits,
meet in the social networks and exchange information (with some probability). This in-
formation is used for the secondary update of beliefs as well as for adjusting the attitude
4It is assumed tax authority knows that in paid employment income tax is fully deducted at source,
and there is no opportunity for earning additional income that could be concealed. This assumption
could be modied in a more general model to allow an additional income for individuals in employment
and a possibility to evade tax on that income.
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Figure 5: Average risk aversion by occupation
to evasion. The process repeats in the next period. At time zero beliefs and attitudes
are assigned at random; in the simulations the e¤ect of the initial condition disappears
after about 20 periods. The results of the simulations are reported for beta distribution
of earnings.
Figure 5 illustrates the self-selection of individuals into di¤erent occupational groups
according to their risk aversion, with time periods on the horizontal axis and risk aversion
on the vertical axis. In the simulations each individual agent is assigned a coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 10. This remains
constant for a given individual, and is one of the drivers of the occupational choice and
the compliance decision. The three lines show the average coe¢ cient of risk aversion of
agents in paid employment and the two self-employed occupations. The averages for each
occupation change as agents switch between occupations as their beliefs about audits and
attitudes to evasion change over time. There is a clear indication that agents with higher
risk aversion choose paid employment, whereas the agents with the lowest risk aversion
choose the riskier type of self-employment.
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Figure 6: Subjective belief by occupation
The patterns in beliefs and attitudes that emerge in the economy are illustrated in
Figures 6 and 7. Both the belief about audits and the attitude to evasion are a¤ected by
the interaction and information exchange in social networks, and information exchange is
more likely between those members of social network who are in the same occupation. It is
expected, therefore, that agents in di¤erent occupations are likely to exhibit, on average,
di¤erent beliefs and attitudes. Figure 6 shows that, indeed, the subjective belief about
the probability of audit is the lowest among employed, close to the objective probability
at 0:05 (in these simulations), whereas for self-employed it is sustained at a much higher
level, about 0:2. Figure 6 illustrates the outcome under the assumption of the target e¤ect.
Because the employed are never audited, their subjective belief about the probability of
audit declines most of the time, but has occasional jumps after the exchange of information
with an audited self-employed agent. Because the chance (and, therefore, the frequency
in a large sample) of such an exchange is non-negligible, the subjective belief of employed
does not converge to zero. The audit probability of the self-employed remains higher
because jumps occur after two types of event: being audited and exchanging information
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with someone who has been audited. The rst channel is absent for the employed, and
through the second channel the self-employed are more likely to exchange information
with other self-employed than with the employed, which also makes jumps more frequent
for self-employed. The value of the belief (0.18 in these simulations) is determined by a
combination of parameters, including the distribution of earnings in di¤erent occupations
and the distribution of preference parameters which determine proportion of agents in
di¤erent occupations and, therefore, the likelihood of meeting an agent who had been
audited.
The pattern in Figure 6 obtains under the target e¤ect assumption on the belief update;
under the bomb-crater e¤ect the subjective beliefs are persistent at an even higher level.
It might seem that the opposite should occur since an audit under the bomb-crater
e¤ect causes the belief to fall to a low level. However, because the proportion of audited
taxpayers is low (5% of self-employed), the majority of agents are not audited in a given
period and for those not audited the belief that they will be audited next period grows
under the bomb-crater e¤ect until they are audited. The longer is the average time
between audits the higher is the average belief. The converse is true for the target e¤ect
where the belief falls between audits. For this reason the average belief is high under the
bomb-crater e¤ect.
Figure 7 illustrates the average rate of compliance (the proportion of honest declara-
tions) for each type of self-employment, along with the economy-wide rate of compliance.
Compliance is lower in the riskier occupation: just over 30 % of agents in self-employment
2 declare their income honestly, whereas in self-employment 1 the rate is around 50%; this
illustrates our point about the link between risk-taking in the choice of occupation and in
the evasion decision. The overall level of compliance in the economy is around 62 %. The
di¤erences in compliance rates are driven partly by the di¤erences in risk aversion and
partly by the di¤erences in attitudes to evasion: exchanging information with more com-
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Figure 7: Compliance by occupation
pliant agents reinforces the importance of the social norm of compliance, and, conversely,
interacting with non-compliant agents makes non-compliance feel less unacceptable.
6 Audit Strategies
The model is su¢ ciently rich to permit a range of questions to be investigated. Of
particular interest is the choice of audit strategy by the tax authority. Audits are costly,
and the tax authority might be interested in identifying a strategy or a set of strategies that
deliver the highest compliance at a given cost, or result in the highest revenue collected net
of audit cost. It is natural to ask, for example, whether random audits or audits targeting
a particular group of taxpayers, or some mix of both, deliver a higher tax yield in an
environment where taxpayers are inuenced in their compliance decisions by their own
experience as well as the experience of other taxpayers. In addition to the benchmark case
of random audits with constant exogenous probability we consider the optimal number of
random audits, alternative audit strategies, and the choice between audit types (hard,
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Figure 8: Tax and ne revenues for four strategies
where all concealed income is revealed at a higher cost of audit, or soft, where only
part of concealed income is revealed, but at a lower cost). The focus of this section is on
alternative audit strategies.
We analyze and compare the outcomes of four di¤erent audit strategies: random au-
dits of the self-employed with a xed probability (Fixed PA), audits of a xed number
of taxpayers in each self-employed occupation (Fixed NA), audits switching between self-
employed occupations each period (Fixed NAA), and audits switching randomly between
self-employed occupations (Fixed NAR). Rather than introducing the cost of audits ex-
plicitly, we construct the strategies with xed numbers of audits to match the mean
number of audits from the random audit strategy, so that on average over time the total
cost of audits is the same for all four strategies. Given the same (average) cost, the best
strategy is the one that delivers the largest amount of tax revenue (including the nes
collected from caught evaders).
Figure 8 shows the amount of tax and ne revenues collected in every period for these
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four di¤erent audit strategies under the assumption of the target e¤ect. The outcome
is very similar for the bomb-crater e¤ect. Although no strategy is uniformly better in
every period, the strategy with the xed number of audits for each occupation appears
to deliver higher yield more often than the remaining two strategies. This observation
is veried in Figures 9 and 10, where the empirical cumulative density function (cdf) is
plotted for all four series of tax and ne revenues from Figure 8 for the target e¤ect and
the corresponding gure for the bomb-crater e¤ect (not shown here). Strategy Fixed NA
dominates the other three strategies, in the sense of the rst-order stochastic dominance.5
This implies that a revenue service with an objective function increasing in tax and ne
revenue (in particular, the total amount of revenue) should prefer this strategy over the
other three when maximizing the expected value of the objective function. The means
and standard deviations of tax and ne revenues are reported in tables 2 and 3. This
nding seems to be robust to the behavioural assumption on the taxpayersimmediate
reaction to an audit.
Strategy PA NA NAA NAR
Mean 2.1267 2.1504 2.1465 2.1004
Standard deviation 0.0539 0.0489 0.0455 0.0612
Table 2: Summary statistics, target e¤ect
Strategy PA NA NAA NAR
Mean 3.5899 3.6135 3.5999 3.5888
Standard deviation 0.0538 0.0521 0.0446 0.0599
Table 3: Summary statistics, bomb crater e¤ect
Our understanding for why strategy Fixed NA dominates the other three strategies is
the following. In the three alternative strategies the number of agents audited in each self-
employed occupation changes every period, and the deterioration in beliefs and compliance
5In this context, strategy A dominates strategy B in the sense of the rst-order stochastic dominance,
if for every level of revenue, R, the probability of collecting at least R is higher under A than under B.
Equivalently, the empirical cdf of revenues collected under A is everywhere below (or to the right from)
the empirical cdf of revenues collected under B.
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Figure 9: Empirical cdfs for tax and ne revenues: target e¤ect
Figure 10: Empirical cdf for tax and ne revenues under four audit strategies: bomb-crater
e¤ect.
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in the occupation that has been audited less outweighs the improvement in beliefs and
compliance in the occupation that has been audited more. With a xed probability of
audit the long-run average number of audits is the same as with the xed number of
audits, but it varies substantially from period to period. Again, the negative e¤ect on
beliefs and compliance from a lower number of audits in some periods outweighs the
positive e¤ect from a higher number of audits in some other periods. This suggests that
there is a non-linearity or asymmetry, or, in a dynamic setting, some kind of hysteresis
in the response of tax revenue to changes in beliefs and compliance so that constancy in
the number of audits for each occupation is benecial. Expressed di¤erently, the revenue
service gains from maintaining a constant degree of audit pressure on the each occupation.
7 Conclusions
The compliance decision combines a range of economic, psychological, and social ele-
ments. Included amongst these are perceptions of risk and attitudes toward risk-taking,
the importance of social standing and conformity to group norms, and the transmission
of information through social contacts. A compelling model of the compliance decision
requires these components to be combined and embedded within a taxpayer equilibrium.
Agent-based modelling provides the ideal methodology for bringing disparate elements
into a cohesive whole. The combination of the agent-based model with the structure of
a social network to govern interaction provides a rich environment in which to explore
compliance. A particular strength of agent-based modelling is that it has the potential to
accommodate complex optimization and learning processes.
The models that we have presented in this paper emphasize the importance of opportu-
nities for non-compliance, and the link that this creates between occupational choice and
risk attitude. Risky forms of self-employment will be chosen by those who are most willing
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to accept risk and to exploit most fully the available opportunities for non-compliance. As
a consequence, compliance behaviour can vary signicantly across occupational groups.
The methodology is very exible and is, therefore, able to incorporate recent advances
in the theory of compliance. Our work emphasizes the role of attitudes, beliefs and oppor-
tunities, and draws ideas from advances in behavioural economics. A further advantage
of an agent-based model of tax compliance is that it can incorporate a variety of di¤er-
ent intervention strategies by the revenue service. We have contrasted random audits
with three alternative strategies and have observed that the strategy with xed number
of audits in each occupation delivers the highest tax yield, keeping the average cost of
audits constant across strategies. The strategies considered in this paper are not the only
ones available to tax authorities. In particular, these strategies do not make use of the
information obtained in the previous rounds of audit. One further direction of research
is to explore the e¤ect of predictive analytics, or the use of past information on taxpayers
for predicting their future compliance behaviour, on audit outcomes.
Agent-based modelling is certain to become more inuential in economic analysis as in-
creased computing power permits ever greater model sophistication. Properly constructed
models will provide an ideal testing place for policy interventions that cannot be imme-
diately tested in practice. Our models show a little of what can be achieved, but much
more is possible.
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